Introduction
Livestock raids in Karamoja, Northern Uganda, are portrayed in the mass media, government literature and civil society reports as armed, inter-ethnic violence triggered by resource scarcity and tradition. This oversimplifies a complex phenomenon with a deep-rooted history of adaptation and transformation vis-à-vis absent or distant governance, proliferation of small arms, an uncontrolled, fast-growing market economy, and haphazard and unbalanced modernization.
A differentiation in the motives and functions of raiding, and the actors involved, is the focus of this paper. Such a differentiation is crucial for peace building although it is not necessarily evident to outsiders. Raiding has always had a variety of functions, including restocking after a loss, and allowing for alliances, marriages, or territorial expansion. This kind of raiding has largely been a group activity, with the whole community sharing both risks and benefits between these forms of raiding and commercial raiding. This paper describes the conflict between the community and the military, and links it to the failure to acknowledge the complexity of raiding, leading to the use of a brutal and largely counter-productive approach against the very people who are supposed to be given protection.
Methodology and Background
Obtaining data on the commercialization of raids is very difficult as the work is highly sensitive. Information used here originates from over ten years of research looking at conflict and raiding in Karamoja. This includes in-depth, face-to-face interviews across a wide range of actors, from politicians and government officials, to elders, youths, women, members of civil society, and faith-based organizations. Media articles have also been used, keeping in mind that inaccessibility is a problem even for reporters, and so what is reported is sometimes hearsay. Care has been taken not to rely on these sources alone, but rather to cross-check important information against other sources, including phone interviews and e-mails with the many contacts the author has secured over a decade of work in the area.
On a plateau spread over 27,200 sq km at 1,000 m altitude, Karamoja is roughly the size of Belgium. With average precipitations of 500-700 mm a year (hence significantly better than neighbouring Turkana), Karamoja is for most of the time a land of dust, thorns, sun and wind, where mobile livestock production has so far proved to be the only sustainable form of exploitation (cf. Although there is an increased demand for meat to supply urban growth, the benefits are not felt by most pastoralists. A report by UNOCHA (2007) describes how pastoralists are often forced to sell their livestock at low prices, having travelled far to sell them and being unable to afford to trek back with them. The urban-based wholesalers are the main beneficiaries. A few rich pastoralists do benefit, and manage to accumulate large numbers of cattle, but most young men, who in the past would have had the opportunity to build up their own stocks, are now facing unemployment and poverty (Mkutu 2005 ). Many of these now work for elite cattle-owners and, when engaging in risky armed raiding, they do it largely on their behalf.
Akoko raiding
Several terms in Nga'Karamojong are translated into English as 'raiding'.
Different terms refer to different functions and, therefore, to different practices.
The term areom describes 'raiding' for restocking, for example after a drought or an epidemic. Retaliatory 'raiding' is called ajore. If 'raiding' is the work of young men acting without community consent, for sale of cattle and commercial gain, the term used in Nga'Karamojong is akoko (cf. Gomes and Mkutu 2004) . In Upe Pokot too, there is more than just 'raiding', with a critical distinction also hingeing on social legitimacy. Thus luk describes a party of warriors acting with the blessing of elders and seers, sent out to replenish stocks or in retaliation after a suffered attack. The setat on the other hand is, like akoko , a non-authorized ' rapidly along a series of 'receivers', across national and international boundaries. These specialists could evade colonial restrictions to cattle movements and even quarantines, and were able to manipulate market prices. In a study of the Kuria of Kenya and Tanzania, Fleisher (1999) observes how, in the 1920s, 'raiding' had become an increasingly violent, market-oriented enterprise, which he links to the pressures exerted by the penetration of the cash economy in pastoral areas. Juma (2000) notes that 'raiding has become an income generating activity rather than a means for augmenting social status or fulfilling cultural roles'. According to Bujra (2000) cattle stealing by one pastoral group from another is widespread, highly organised, and often led by outsiders. The growing demand for meat in urban areas has substantially increased prices on the livestock market. Flourishing export markets have opened opportunities to market raided animals well beyond the pastoral areas (Juma, 2000) . Senior security officers in Tanzania linked the cattle rustling conflict in Tarime, an area on the Kenyan border, to underground dimensions of the livestock market involving cross-border criminal networks.2
Raided cattle fetch a higher price across the border in Kenya.
In Karamoja, akoko raiding is more frequent today than the other kinds of raiding. The very nature of these raids means that the karachunas (young men) directly involved in the theft partake in a much bigger industry. The following sections highlight some of the mechanisms of such an industry and the other players involved.
Trading Livestock Osterie (2007: 198) In the period immediately after the ban was lifted, the following figures were recorded (the peak in price in the first week was likely to be due to increased demand after the ban): Cattle markets are run by the LC3s, local businessmen, and veterinary departments. Controls on the origin of marketed animals and identity of the sellers are relaxed and under-resourced. Assistance to recover animals identified as stolen is poor. In Namalu and Amudat in 2003, the author observed lorryloads of cattle also being sold at informal markets. The drivers claimed that they were to be transported to Mbale.8 Prices on the black market are much lower but animals can be sold very quickly and without questions. These markets are the VOLUME 14 ISSUE 2 NOMADIC PEOPLES (2010) 91 first reference for stolen cattle ( namorat cattle). If fear of detection is low, the raiders will sometimes keep a few of the cows, but they usually sell the majority to purchase alcohol, material goods, and food for their families.9
In an interview with a local Catholic sister who had been several years in Karamoja, she noted that raids happen more often on the day before the market. 10 However, this phenomenon has not been formally examined. During fieldwork in 2001 and 2004, 1 saw that large pieces of meat were being sold on the roadside near a locality known as Kamsaba, on the road between Nakapiripirit and Moroto.11 In fact, on one occasion one of our team members bought some. It was later suggested to me that these were likely to be stolen animals. According to informants from Kotido, interviewed in 2009, 12 large pieces of meat are at times on offer at bargain prices on the outskirts of town. A quarter of a cow can be bought for as little as USh 10,000 (USD 5) when the price for a cow at the cattle market rarely dropped below USh 150,000 (USD 75). Even USh 10,000 however, remains well above the purchasing power of the poor and is therefore more likely to represent a good deal only to relatively well off urban dwellers.
Interviews with market operators hinted at the existence of 'raiding networks', connecting thieves to livestock and markets. For example, thieves from Bokora who have lived in Pian can lead raids to an exact location in Bokora, where cattle can be found, and use contacts in Pian for marketing the stolen animals.13 John
Owalinga, a cattle trader in Nabilatuk argued that:
The rustling is now organized, because you have people watching you.
You buy cattle from them and they wait for you on the road and ambush you and take the cattle you bought from them again. The cattle stolen are reported to the LCI or LC2 but they can do nothing. In fact some of them are kraal leaders and who knows? They may be connected with the karachunas selling the stolen cattle.14 A kraal leader is supposed to be elected by the elders on the basis of his prowess as a pastoralist. That Local Council leaders, who are typically living in a settlement, today are also 'kraal leaders' is therefore a new phenomenon. prominent individuals, going through unchecked as the officers felt they did not have enough power to question the details of these transfers.17 A former MP from Karamoja, interviewed in 2003, made reference to issues of corruption involving local councils and UPDF officers, and explaining why more cattle are recovered than those effectively returned to the owners. Big bulls, he said, are taken from the herd and transported by night to markets outside of Karamoja.18 References to collusion between the army, local leaders and businessmen with regard to cattle raiding are common in Ugandan media. In one episode reported by the media, ten soldiers including a commanding officer were arrested in connection with theft of cattle recovered during disarmament operations. It was noted that deployment to Kapedo, Kathile and Karenga (Kaabong district), where the UPDF' s 65th and 45th battalions were operating, was known to make officers rapidly wealthy. 19 Through this disparate collection of information, although still scanty, a picture is emerging of a significant industry resting on commercialized cattle raiding practices and involving various ranks of non-pastoralist players. Further work is needed to establish if the same players are involved in transportation of both cattle and guns.
Bridging Raiders and Markets
In the last two and a half decades, a relatively new dynamic has been observed, consisting of rich men hijacking akoko cattle raiding for their own personal advantage. Ocan (1994) has not yet been the object of systematic research.
There is some evidence of overlap between 'racketeers' and traders. A former raider recalled a story of a businessman who owned a butchery in Kotido, but also hired young men to raid, and would sometimes go with them. The cows would be divided and would supply his shop. The activity was discovered when he was shot and killed by security during a raid.22
Two of the most prosperous and oldest businesses in Matany trading centre (Bokora County) are known to have been established starting from raiding profits (Akabwai and Ateyo, 2007) . Allegations that commercial raiding has attracted certain powerful individuals, including local government officers and politicians, are not uncommon in the Ugandan press.23
Commercial Raiding and Kraals
It would be incomplete to examine the networks involved in commercial raiding without examining kraals, where cattle are taken care of, and where they are Kraal leaders are known to oversee areom raiding (for restocking) and ajore raiding (retaliatory), but not much is known about their involvement in akoko raiding (non-authorized, for commercial gain) and the market. An elder interviewed at a kraal in Kotido in 2003 hinted at an ongoing transformation:
'I've notice the trends changing last year. Out of the raided animals at least one is sold to meet the raider's basic needs. For example, early last year cows were brought here. On the very day they arrived, by 10:00 am, there were already bargains for the cows. It wasn't a market day.'27 This suggests that the three types of raiding distinct in Nga'Karamojongareom , ajore and akoko -are not mutually exclusive. There also seems to be some flexibility in determining what actions can be justified to 'meet the raider's basic needs', an issue that certainly deserves further research.
Banditry
Closely related to akoko raiding is road banditry. In the course of the 2000s, banditry became so common in Karamoja that vehicles were required to travel with armed escorts. Robbers also targeted cattle traders on the road. 
Livestock and Livelihood
To the majority of the people of Karamoja, livestock is life. It has been their 'bank' and 'granary' ( edula ), their survival ( ngitunga ) and their 'everything' (i dadang ). In order to buy whatever they need for their livelihood, people sell livestock, at least those people who still have some to sell. A group of Tepeth youth, who I met in 2007, linked raiding with the pressures on young men to protect livestock and settlements while also providing for their families:
[Raiding] is motivated by hunger. There is nothing to eat, and we are born here in this bush so we don't know how to grow food! We grow up and find that our father has no animals . showing them the way to the kraals of their own people.35 This is both raiding for survival and commercialized raiding, which in the case above was considered by the elders to be theft. It begs the question as to why raiders' needs were not being met within the accepted regulated framework for raiding, and suggests some sort of breakdown in the structure of pastoral society rendering certain parties vulnerable. As stated by the former minister for Karamoja, Hon. Peter Lokeris, 'Cattle have come to remain with those who have the means to keep them, that is, the guns.' The risk of losing everything to raiders is a factor leading today to the marketing also of livestock that would normally be kept for production. Longoli, a Nabilatuk elder of Nakapiripirit District seven years ago revealed that he owned nearly six hundred head of cattle with hundreds of goats and sheep that served as his sole source of livelihood. He stated that the animals were his pride and he had no desire to sell. However, most of the cattle were raided, leaving him with only thirty head of cattle, which he also sold.36
Military Intervention
State intervention in Karamoja through the UPDF followed a two-fold strategy:
imposing law and order with regard to all kinds of raiding (including the recovery of raided livestock), and disarming the population in Karamoja. Whilst both parts of this strategy have involved excessive use of military force against civilians, neither has been successful, suggesting that the strategy itself needs to be reconsidered rather than intensified. For a start, the complexity of cattle raiding, and in particular the changes introduced through the spread of commercial forms of raiding, have been disregarded. The law enforcement efforts have concentrated on the youngsters directly involved with raiding but have ignored the wider and multifaceted networks that link raiding to the markets. The current indiscriminating repression, whilst not stopping violence, is triggering resistance and fuelling mistrust. The formal military protection of kraals emerged in 2007. The protected kraal system had two purposes: i. protecting livestock from raiders; and ii. tracking of stolen animals, both through pursuit and through surveillance of the livestock kept in kraals. The assumption was that if all livestock were kept in protected kraals, the stolen animals would be easily identified and recovered. However, the strategy was decided without consultation with the pastoralists.
UPDF protection never proved as effective as when armed herders protected themselves and their livestock. In fact, the large numbers of cattle in protected kraals soon became an attractive target for raiders. 41 In Lopei, the protected kraal started in 2006 with 13,000 cows, but had less than 1,500 remaining by May 20 10, 42 either lost to raids or removed by owners in response to insecurity.43 In Namalu a kraal started with 6,000 cows but animals were repeatedly raided despite the military protection. 44 In an interview with a civil servant who has worked in the region since 2001, the weakness of protected kraals has been lack of soldiers and lack of discipline. 45 A former MP in Karamoja likened kraals to banks, protected kraals being 'the poor man's banks'. Beside these 'banks' for impoverished herders, there are big 'banks', in which important people keep their cattle. There are two such kraals, one in Moroto and one in Kotido, that are protected by private guards and that do not seem to have been vulnerable to attack. On the other hand, in many areas where there are protected kraals, guns have been collected and protection promised, but cows have been lost and this is leading the communities to rearm. 46 Area politicians including MPs Francis Kiyonga (Pokot) and Abraham Lokii (Jie), who are both facing prosecution for allegedly 'inciting violence', have accused the army of failing to protect civilian communities that turned in their guns, rendering them vulnerable to other cattle raiders. 47 In early 2010 in Jie county, sixty people were killed during a raid on a protected kraal. The army stated that these were 'warriors' killing each other. It later transpired that the army had hired twenty men in this area to guard the kraal and on hearing that a raid would take place had put them up front where a carried out an assessment of the situation shortly after the event, said that 'ten bodies were found still at the location, six of which were children'.57
Uganda Human Rights Commission is now asking the Ugandan military to punish its own officers implicated in wayward conduct: 'The Commission calls upon the leadership of the UPDF to institute thorough investigations into the allegations which the commission has drawn to their attention.'58 A further barrier to trust is that UPDF soldiers have been reported as stealing cows from locals and selling them (Gomes and Mkutu 2004) . Nabilatuk Lately, when the army came to Naguliet in Loroo sub-county, they tortured people indiscriminately until some who had no guns confessed they had guns -just to end the pain. My problem began on January 14, 2010. On that day, some Pokot raided animals in our area. A military helicopter pursued the rustlers and found my animals at a water point and bombed them and I wondered why. The next morning, the army came from Anguruma détaché [detachment] and took away all my 350 cattle; I reported to UPDF commanders and local government officials at Loroo sub-county headquarters. They told me to mention the thieves. I organised a clan meeting and got names of 27 suspects, which I gave to the authorities. The army took no step and I later learned that the soldiers had eaten some of my animals and gave others away. I collapsed crying. We thought the army was to give us security; the UPDF has now become a tribe in Karamoja raiding cattle.59
Nayokootuk: a Community-based Security System (CBSS)
The Karimojong now are asking for a new generation of vigilante scheme by the name of 'community-based security system' (CBSS). The community are greatly concerned about disarmament, and how it is affecting their security and livelihood. They do not perceive that the state security is acting in their own interests and are reported as saying that the UPDF are not protecting them.
Community leaders have requested that if disarmament has to continue, a 'human security approach' should be taken. 60 It is envisaged that CBSS would offer rapid response to cattle raids, provide frontline security, and protect property within kraals and villages. It would also create a 'resident' (hence sustainable) security system in Karamoja, with the goal being to relieve the UPDF and paramilitary groups like the Anti-Stock Theft Units (ASTUs) and Local Defence Units (LDUs) from involvement in tracking petty criminals like cattle thieves and highway bandits. 63 The suggestion is not popular with the state, but may be worthy of consideration and support. However, the same concerns exist as with previous generations of vigilante (Mkutu 2008b ).
There do not appear to be any safeguards in place to ensure control on weapons or the welfare and professionalism of those employed.
Conclusion
This paper has drawn attention to the complexity of violent cattle raiding in pastoralists' own perception; namely through the distinction between raiding for restocking, raiding for retaliation, and 'unauthorised' (by the elders) raiding for marketing (stealing in order to sell). The analysis has focused on the third type, akoko , which has its own internal complexity because of its private and 'unauthorized' nature, shady players, widespread networks, and important synergies with the market. Although the most common form of raiding today, akoko raiding is virtually ignored by the media, government documents, and policies aimed at mitigating raiding violence. On the other hand, is seems worth considering whether there is scope to work with the community specifically against the akoko raiding, which they themselves find largely damaging.
In Karamoja today, the market economy is a significant and necessary part of pastoralists' life. Animal production generates substantial wealth, as demonstrated by the figures for the Karamoja livestock markets, and should therefore be able to provide for the needs of the communities of producers. That this is not happening, together with evidence of the links between raiding and markets, raises concerns.
So far, the role of the market has received little attention in research or discussion on conflict resolution in Karamoja, although in other pastoral areas such work has been done (Little 2005 (Little , 2006 (Little , 2007 . Possibilities for managing the markets as a route to stability and prosperity in Karamoja have yet to be explored. One way in which this might take place is for every animal to be registered and to require a certificate in order to be sold. Although expensive, it may be easy to carry out with mobile phones. This would need to be managed by local governments. Survival needs are a major factor in a man's decision to risk his own life in raiding and banditry. Acknowledging this may assist in coming up with strategies to reduce raiding. Disarmament cannot succeed in a context where the gun is essential for survival. The current approach with its lack of understanding of the complexities of raiding and the needs of those involved has alienated the community and may have led to a missed opportunity to assist the communities in managing their own problems. The recent proposal of a community-based security system (CBSS) is an indicator of this sense of failure in the perspective of the communities.
